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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In light of the above observations, a third rationale is pos-
sible; that is, admitting the Hayes interpretation to read a
constitutional test into Article 3863.
It can be said that even when one has it within his dis-
cretion to perform or not to perform, he is nevertheless under
a ministerial duty to exercise his discretion in a lawful manner.
That lawful manner is determined by the grant of authority
he has received and by the United States Constitution. As noted
above,35 the Constitution requires that discretionary duties not
be performed in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable man-
ner. A "ministerial" duty, provided by the clear command of the
Constitution, exists to exercise one's authority and discretion
in a reasonable fashion. Thus, the courts could uphold the statute
by reading a "reasonableness" requirement into the definition
of "ministerial."
The holding of Hayes unnecessarily limits the use of man-
damus, and though not necessary under the Code, is unconsti-
tutional unless tempered with a "reasonableness" requirement.36
The proper and more desirable conclusion is that the juris-
prudentially created "gross abuse" exception is not precluded
by the Code of Civil Procedure.
Jerry F. Davis
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BECAUSE OF SIMULATED CONSENT
The Twenty-Second Judicial District Court declared null a
marriage in which the man's consent was obtained because of
the woman's mistaken claim that she was pregnant.' The record
shows that the formalities of law necessary for a valid marriage
were observed and that the outward manifestations of the
parties were to enter into a valid marriage. The girl believed
she was pregnant and in order to avoid the embarrassment and
cepted from the provisions of the act. Id. 49:951(2)(C). Thus, as beneficial as
the Administrative Procedure Act is, it does not moot the arguments presented in
this Note, especially when one begins to enumerate the many remaining state, par-
ish, and municipal agencies which are vested with discretion which, if abused,
could easily prejudice substantial rights.
35. See text at notes 26-31 supra.
36. It is interesting to note that in the Introduction to Title III of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure (Ewtraordinary Remedies) it is stated, in a
"Summary of Procedural Changes in Title II" by the late Henry G. McMahon
that: "The only changes in the procedural rules governing the extraordinary reme-
dies of habeas corpus, mandamus, and quo warranto are those made by Art. 2823
[which relates to service of habeas corpus]." (Emphasis added.)
1. McDonald v. Galloway, No. 29063, La. 22d Judicial District (1968).
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difficulties that would result, the man who believed himself
responsible for what they both thought her condition to be
agreed to participate in a marriage ceremony. The marriage
was not consummated and upon learning the woman was not
pregnant, the man sued for a declaration of nullity. The plaintiff
alleged that he had never consented to marriage, or at most his
consent was only simulated, for his primary motivation was
not matrimony. The judge did not issue a written reason for
judgment.
According to Article 902 of the Louisiana Civil Code there
is no marriage unless both parties were willing to contract,
were able to contract, and did contract pursuant to the forms
and solemnities prescribed by law. In the instant case, there
was no question of the validity, or capacity, of the parties to
contract marriage, nor did the parties fail to pursue the forms
and solemnities prescribed by law in giving outward manifesta-
tions of consent. Thus if the decision in the instant case is to be
justified under the legislation it must be either because the
manifestation of consent by one or both of the parties was made
unwillingly within the terms of the legislation, or because Article
90 contemplates it may be shown that the manifestation of
consent, though freely made, was not accompanied by an actual
internal or subjective intent to contract marriage.
Can it be said the man in this case was "unwilling" to con-
tract marriage? Of the articles following Article 90 in the Civil
Code, only Article 913 speaks of unwillingness to marry, and it
does so only in the context of stating three instances in which
an outward manifestation of consent will not be considered
freely made: when given to a ravisher (abductor) ; when ex-
erted by violence; and when there is a mistake respecting the
person. Of these three instances only the third, mistake respect-
ing the person, might possibly be applicable, and then only if
that phrase can be construed to include mistake respecting a
quality of the other person and pregnancy vel non is to be con-
sidered such a quality. The Louisiana jurisprudence restricts
the phrase to that of mistake in the identity of the other person. 4
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 90.
3. Id. art. 91: "No marriage is valid to which the parties have not freely con-
sented. Consent is not free:
"1. When given to a ravisher, unless it has been given by the party rav-
ished, after she has 'been restored to the enjoyment of liberty;
"2. When extorted by violence;
"3. When there is mistake respecting the person, whom one of the parties
intended to marry."
4. Delpit v. Young, 51 La. Ann. 923, 25 So. 547 (1899).
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Most French writers place a similar restriction on the identical
phrase in French Civil Code,5 but other French writers and some
French decisions have acknowledged nullity in instances of
mistake as to a substantial quality of the other person.6 Planiol
cites French cases where marriages were declared null because
of the quality of person of one of the parties. One was where a
woman married a freed convict without knowledge of his past
conviction and two others were cases of French women having
married German citizens believing them to be French. The Eng-
lish Matrimonial Causes Act of 1937 lists six conditions, which
may be considered as quality of the person, that render a mar-
riage voidable; but mistaken belief in pregnancy is not among
them. 7 It does not appear that there is any basis in the Louisiana
legislation or jurisprudence that would furnish a justification for
holding that pregnancy vel non is a "mistake respecting the
person" that would render a marriage null.
After ruling out the applicability of the three conditions
listed in Article 91, for showing "unwillingness" to marry, the
next inquiry must concern the exclusiveness of the listing. Is it
possible that certain frauds and mistakes may be within the
intent of that article? In most American jurisdictions a mar-
riage which has been induced by a fraud or deceit may be
declared a nullity where it is a fraud or deceit that affects in a
vital way the very essence of the marriage relation. 8 At least
three states have granted annulments where the female fraud-
ulently claimed to be pregnant by the man she married when in
fact she was not pregnant. New York as early as 1903 granted
an annulment in such a case.9 In 1961 Wisconsin expressly over-
turned its previous jurisprudence and declared null a marriage
where the female fraudulently claimed to be pregnant.10 Ken-
tucky did so last year.1" What these courts would have done had
the claim of pregnancy been mistake rather than fraud is not
known. In the Kentucky case one of the concurring judges said
his opinion might have been different had it been mistake. Why
this should make a difference is not easy to understand, since
in either case the consenting male acted upon a belief that the
claim was true when in fact it was not.
5. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 146.
6. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 1061 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
7. THE REPORT OF A COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE ARCHBISHOPS OF CAN-
TERBURY AND YORK, THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND 23 (1955).
8. 4 Am. J U. 2d, Annulment of Marriage § 12 (1962).
9. Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 67 N.E. 63 (N.Y. App. 1903).
10. Masters v. Masters, 13 Wis. 2d 332, 188 N.W.2d 674 (1961).
11. Parks v. Parks, 418 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. App. 1967).
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The French Civil Code and the Louisiana Civil Code omit
all reference to fraud as a basis of nullity. Planiol states this
omission in the French Code was intentional because in mar-
riage "he deceives who can.''12 Thus, the French sources from
which the Louisiana Code article was taken tend to support a
belief that it was the intention of the legislature to omit fraud
as a basis of nullity. In at least one case involving consent to
marriage, Delpit v. Young," the Louisiana Supreme Court has
rejected the opinions of the French writers, in favor of a more
strict interpretation of the three conditions listed in Article 91.
Although it appears that there is not an absolutely firm basis to
determine the three conditions listed in Article 91 which render
consent unfree are exclusive or if some forms of fraud and mis-
take of fact that go to the essence of the marriage relation are
within the intent of the article; the Delpit case seemingly indi-
cates that the Louisiana courts will tend to interpret the three
conditions very strictly. But even if these three conditions are
not exclusive, little, if any, support can be found for finding
that a mistaken belief that the woman was pregnant can be con-
sidered as within the intent of that article.
Assuming legal unwillingness to manifest consent does not
exist in this case, it is necessary to turn to the question, whether
within the terms of Article 90, consent may be said to exist
when there is no actual internal or subjective intent correspond-
ing to the freely given manifestation of consent. A previous
writer in the Louisiana Law Review suggests that marriages
may be a nullity in certain cases upon a proper showing that
consent was simulated because in such a case there is no meeting
of the minds as to the principal cause of the marriage contract. 4
This proposition has not been ruled upon in the jurisprudence
of this state. It was raised in a recent case, but was avoided
by other means. 15 Canon law, the remote ancestor of our mar-
riage laws, provides that internal consent of the mind is always
presumed to have been in agreement with that externally ex-
pressed, but it also provides that this presumption may be over-
come by contrary proof.16 Additionally canon law provides that
consent to marriage may be conditional, and if the condition
12. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 1057 (La. St. L. Inst. transi. 1959).
13. Delpit v. Young, 51 La. Ann. 923, 25 So. 547 (1899).
14. Comment, 20 LA. L. REV. 560, 580 (1960).
15. Parker v. Saileau, 213 So.2d 190 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
16. T. BOUScAEN & A. ELLIS, CANON LAW, A TEXT AND COMMENTARY 551
(3d ed. 1957).
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fails then there is no consent. 17 The report of a commission
appointed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York in 1955
points out that English law looks to consent as expressed and
will not allow the parties to derogate privately from their public
professions. 18 Even a private written agreement entered into
before marriage that the parties will never live together does not
render an English marriage invalid.' 9 The report emphasizes the
obvious abuses that may result from a recognition of simulated or
conditional consent as a basis of nullity. It does not seem illogical
to assume that had the framers of our Code intended that a seri-
ous, public manifestation of consent, by one of sound mind and
in full control of his faculties, could be overcome by proof of
an absence of actual internal consent they would have so stated
in clear explicit terms. On the other hand it would seem logical
that where a party was insane, under the influence of narcotics
or alcohol, or was otherwise not in control of his mental facul-
ties, a finding of no consent would be within the intent of
Article 90 even though there was a public manifestation of
consent.
It does not appear that there is a basis within Article 90 for
finding an absence of consent in this case. Neither is there a
basis for finding that the consent was not freely given if we look
only to the three conditions listed in Article 91. Should our courts
hold that the three conditions listed in Article 91 are not exclu-
sive they will then be faced with the problem of where to draw
the line. This writer suggests that expansion of the conditions
listed in Article 91 is a legislative matter and if social conditions
today indicate a need to expand the list of causes that will render
consent to marriage unfree, the expansion should be made by
the legislature and not the judiciary.
Roy L. Wood
SUFFICIENT MEANS UNDER ARTICLE 160 OF THE
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
Article 160 reads: "When the wife has not been at fault, and
she has not sufficient means for her support, the court may allow
her, out of the property and earnings of her husband, alimony
which shall not exceed one-third of his income ... This alimony
17. Id. at 556.
18. THE REPORT OF A COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE ARCHBISHOPS OF CAN,-
TERBURY AND YORK, THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND 27 (1955).
19. Id.
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